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Abstract
Recent financial crisis showed how the unfolding of liquidity risks of financial intermediaries
spilled over to asset markets, contributing to asset price deteriorations and the triggering of
liquidity spirals. This paper derives and tests a financial fragility condition for predicting
asset price peaks on a real-time basis, by combining the term spread and the aggregate
funding liquidity risks of the banking system into a simple binary fragility indicator. The
main empirical result of this paper is that the fragility condition predicted all major equity
market peaks in Germany during the time period 1973 to 2010, including the subprime crisis
of 2007, the New Economy Bubble of 2000, and the 1987 stock market crash. The average
lead time of the indicator is 2.9 months. About 80% of the declines were later on associated
with significant declines in Industrial Production.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Recent financial crisis showed how the unfolding of liquidity risks of financial intermediaries
spilled over to asset markets, contributing to asset price deteriorations and the triggering of
liquidity spirals1. This paper will investigate if the aggregate funding liquidity risk cycle of the
banking sector can be used to time the occurrence of a liquidity spiral which leads to an asset
price peak, where liquidity risks for banks arise from their maturity transformation activity in
the spirit of Diamond-Dybvig. There is so far only one study which investigated if the liquidity
transformation measure and therefore the aggregated liquidity risks of the banking sector can
be connected to financial stress2. However, there is so far no empirical study which tries to link
the liquidity risk cycle of financial intermediaries to the asset price cycle.
The aim of this paper is to develop a fragility condition which times peaks on asset markets,
based on a macroeconomic relationship between the term spread and the liquidity risk cycle of
the banking sector. Whereas the term spread is a popular choice for early warning systems for
real economic stress, in this paper it is used as an indicator for the marginal profitability of
bank liquidity transformation and therefore as an indicator for the incentive for banks to take
on funding liquidity risks. The position within the funding liquidity risk cycle in turn indicates
the severity of a potential liquidity spiral. As long as the term spread is rising, banks are will-
ing to sustain their funding liquidity risk and provide liquidity to economic agents. However,
when there is either a tightening of the policy rate by the central bank or a negative shock for
long-term interest rates which persists for some time, the incentive for banks to supply further
liquidity to the economy (and take on funding liquidity risk) is successively reduced. Once banks
start to cut back their funding liquidity risks, the liquidity transformation cycle will peak and a
liquidity spiral for financial markets and, possibly with a lag, for the real economy will unfold.
Therefore, at the point in time where liquidity transformation peaks, the aggregate liquidity
constraints of the economy become tighter and asset prices are likely to peak. The goal of this
paper is to test if this fragility condition could predict the onset of a decline in the financial
markets within the bank-dominated German financial system for the time period 1973 to 2010.
The main finding of this paper is that the fragility condition predicted all major equity market
peaks in Germany for the past 37 years, including the subprime crisis of 2007, the New Economy
Bubble of 2000, and the 1987 stock market crash. The average lead time of the indicator is 2.9
months. Moreover, nearly all predicted peaks in the equity market were later on associated with
economic recessions. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section gives
a short overview of the economic idea on which the financial fragility signal is based. Section 3
describes the data series and shows how the fragility indicator is constructed. This is followed
by a section presenting the empirical results. The final section concludes.
1see Adrian and Shin (2010), Krishnamurthy (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Fecht (2004)
2see Berger and Bouwman (2008)
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2 Outline of the Financial Fragility Condition
The idea to use the term spread and the funding liquidity risk of the banking sector for deriving
a financial fragility condition is based on the papers of Fecht and Weber (2011), Adrian, Es-
trella, and Shin (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Berger and Bouwman (2008).
The term spread is defined as the difference between long-term and short-term interest rates.
Funding liquidity risk and liquidity transformation are one and the same concept and refer to
the activity of banks to issue long-term assets such as loans and to finance these assets with
shorter-term liabilities (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). It can be argued that liquidity trans-
formation provides a valuable service to the economic system by allowing economic agents to
hold assets of a longer maturity than their liabilities3. Indeed, Fecht and Weber (2011), using
a Panel VAR for major European Monetary Union members, find that an increase in liquidity
transformation leads to a positive reaction of economic growth. Banks which transform liquid-
ity earn the difference between the interest rate on long-term assets and short-term liabilities
(net interest margin) but incur one unit of funding liquidity risk for each unit of created liquidity.
The forecasting power of the term spread for economic recessions is well documented in the
literature (e.g. Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). However, it is less well known why the term spread
actually has forecasting power. In a recent paper, Adrian, Estrella, and Shin (2010) try to
investigate this issue and set up a causality chain trough which a decline in the term spread
may be transmitted to the economy. They argue that a tighter monetary stance leads to a
reduction in the term spread which makes it less profitable for banks to engage in maturity
transformation due to the reduction in the net interest margin. This leads to a lower supply
of credit and ultimately to lower economic growth. Moreover, they argue that the decrease in
credit supply spills back to the term spread, leading to a downward spiral for real economic
activity. Their paper stresses a supply-side perspective on the economy, where balance sheet
conditions and risk-taking of financial intermediaries drive real economic outcomes. Financial
institutions thereby actively manage their balance sheets and react to changes in risk percep-
tions (see Borio and Zhu [2008] for a survey on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy).
This paper will follow a similar line of argumentation. The fragility argument which is de-
rived in this paper, rests on the relationship between the term spread and the willingness of
the banking sector to take on funding liquidity risks on the on hand, and the relationship be-
tween liquidity transformation and asset prices on the other hand. When the term spread is
wide, i.e. the difference between long-term and short-term interest rates is large, the marginal
profitability of liquidity transformation is high and banks are willing to accept a high funding
3Consider the following cases: If a long-term loan is financed by a long-term deposit, banks do not add liquidity
to the economy since a depositor has to give up his liquidity for a long-term borrower. On the other hand, if
a long-term loan is financed by a short-term deposit, both the borrower and the depositor stay liquid and can
react to consumption or investment opportunities.
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liquidity risk and provide a high amount of liquidity to agents in an economy. Hence, the
amount of liquidity transformation and funding liquidity risk-taking are therefore a function of
the size of the term spread. Indeed, Fecht and Weber (2011), find that liquidity transformation
is positively affected by increasing long-term rates and negatively affected by increases in the
policy rate. A persistent decline in the term spread starts to reduce the upward momentum of
liquidity transformation and leads to an increase in the risk aversion of banks which no longer
accept the current level of funding liquidity risk. Ultimately, the liquidity transformation cy-
cle peaks and this will have ramifications for credit growth and the purchasing power as well
as the confidence of investors. Allen and Gale (2000, 2002, 2003) demonstrate that financial
fragility occurs at the point in time, when a positive credit expansion is insufficient to facilitate
further asset price increases. In this paper, financial fragility occurs at the point in time when
liquidity transformation enters its peak phase. Moreover, Allen and Gale (2002) argue that
the uncertainty (and therefore the expectations) of investors about the future path of credit
expansion impacts asset prices. This paper argues that when agents realize that the decline in
the term spread reduces the momentum of liquidity transformation, the demand for risky assets
will start to fall. Hence, the peak phase in asset prices should coincide with the peak phase in
liquidity conditions. An indication that this may hold can be found in Berger and Bouwman
(2008), who showed that liquidity transformation was significantly above its trend before the
onset of the 2007 financial crisis. Moreover, Fecht and Weber (2011) find that equity prices
are directly affected by changes in liquidity transformation, even after controlling for the term
spread and economic growth. Helbling and Terrones (2003), who investigate whether there are
common macroeconomic patterns for boom and bust cycles in equity markets worldwide, find
that credit and money growth4 are the two key variables which increased significantly before
an equity market peak, followed by a significant decline in these variables thereafter.
In summary, the term spread, the liquidity risk/liquidity transformation of the baking sys-
tem and asset prices show different aspects of the financial system but they are interrelated.
A peak in liquidity transformation may be the trigger event for a liquidity spiral: once the
aggregate deleveraging of liquidity risks of the banking sector starts, liquidity is drawn out of
the economic system, leading to overall tighter funding liquidity constraints of financial and
non-financial agents. The start of the drying up of liquidity on an aggregate level puts im-
mediate pressure on asset prices and leads to a decline in business and consumer confidence
and ultimately to lower economic growth. The decrease in confidence will lead to a feedback
effect, putting pressure on the term spread which will reduce the incentive for banks to take on
funding liquidity risks even more and therefore leads to further downward pressure for liquidity
transformation5. The decline in the term spread is most likely to happen due to lower interest
4Note that liquidity transformation can be regarded as a unified measure of money and credit growth.
5There is by now a huge literature on amplifying effects with respect to balance sheet quantity feedback effects:
an initially small shock within the financial system may have a large negative consequence for the whole financial
system and possibly for the real economy (see e.g. Krishnamurthy [2010], Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2008]).
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rates at the long end of the yield curve because of lower expected inflation rates in the future
due to the expected decline in the economic activity. The relationships around the peak phase
of the asset market are graphically depicted in Figure 1. This diagram is an oversimplification
of reality and there are various ways how feedback effects may be transmitted. For example,
equity prices are certainly influenced by economic growth in the long-run but are likely to be
negligible for the time period under consideration in this paper6. Moreover, the successive de-
cline in asset prices is certainly driven by more complex dynamics which cannot be disentangle
on an aggregate level. Note however, that the aim of this paper is to provide a financial fragility
condition which is valid for a short time frame and not to provide insights into the interrelations
and dynamics of the subsequent decline in asset prices7.
Short‐term	interest	rate	
(Policy	rate,	exogenous)	
Long‐term	interest	rate	
Term	Spread	 Liquidity		
Risk	Taking	
Liquidity		
Transformation	
Economy	
(with	a	lag)	
Equity	Prices	
(contemporaneous)	
(feedback	effect	via	inflation	expectations)	
(drawn	for	completeness;	see	e.g.	Estrella	and	Mishkin	[1998])	
Figure 1: The Interrelations during the Asset Price Peak Phase
3 Data and Methodology
A. Data Description and Construction
All data was collected from the Deutsche Bundesbank for the end of the month, including
the monthly bank balance sheet data which is the only source for constructing the liquidity
transformation indicator. In total there are 445 observations for each time-series on a monthly
basis for a period from January 1973 to January 2010. For constructing the financial fragility
indicator, three variables are used: the term spread, the German equity market index DAX 30,
and the liquidity transformation of the German banking sector. The term spread is defined as
the difference between the German five-year government bond rate and the one-year govern-
ment bond rate. The DAX 30 is used as a proxy for the general development of asset prices and
the state of the financial markets. To construct the liquidity creation indicator, a three step
methodology which as proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) is applied: First, all assets
and liabilities of the bank balance sheet are classified as liquid (li), semi-liquid (sl), and illiquid
(il). In the second step, weights are attached to each of these three classes, where a weight to
0.5, 0, -0.5 is given to illiquid, semi-liquid and liquid assets and a weight of 0.5, 0, -0.5 is given
to liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid liabilities. Hence, only balance sheet positions which provide
6Section 4 shows that the average duration of the fragility condition is 3.2 months.
7In the context of a dynamical systems analysis, this paper describes a bifurcation point but disregards the
description (and determinants) of the trajectories in the regime before and after that point.
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liquidity to economic agents have a positive weight. In the final step, all assets and liabilities
are summed up. Double counting is prevented by attaching weights of one-half to each balance
sheet position. Balance sheet positions which are weighted by zero do neither create nor destroy
liquidity for the economy and drop out of the calculation. A detailed derivation of the the bank
liquidity transformation indicator can be found in Berger and Bouwman (2009).
Since the goal of this paper is to derive a financial fragility condition, a binary financial fragility
indicator instead of a probability model is used. For this purpose, liquidity transformation and
the term spread are transferred to binary indicators and subsequently combined multiplicatively
into a binary financial fragility indicator. The approach of transforming variables into binary
signals is similar to the idea of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who transferred distress variables
into binary signals by defining a threshold value above which the variable is in State 1 and if it
is below the threshold value it is in State 0. It is usual to search the threshold value by using a
grid search. However, in this paper, no grid search is conducted in order to prevent over-fitting.
Instead an ad-hoc value of 24 months for the endogenous threshold value was chosen. Moreover,
except for the cumulative sum measures, all other input parameters are fixed at six months.
B. Identification and Dating of Equity Market Peaks
A decline in the DAX of at least 15% from peak-to-trough is defined as an indication of fi-
nancial fragility which corresponds to a distress frequency of 3.5 years (or 11 distress cases over
37 years). We believe that this frequency and size of the decline is sufficiently high enough to
be interpreted as distress8. Peaks and troughs are identified endogenously using a minimum
reversal percentage of 15%. To identify a peak, the DAX has to decline by at least 15% from its
peak, without closing above the high price of the peak date during the decline. The time period
from the highest price level since the beginning of the decline until the lowest price level is then
identified as a declining state and the date at with the high price was identified is defined as
the peak date which the financial fragility indicator ought to predict. The market is defined to
be in the declining state as long as it does not rise by at least 15% from the lowest point. This
methodology will ensure that peaks and troughs alternate. Although this is a backward looking
algorithm, for the purpose of dating peaks it is sufficient. Since we do not have data on the
highest high price of each month, the peak date has a precision of approximately ± 1 month.
C. Construction of the Binary Liquidity Creation Indicator
First, the relative change of liquidity transformation over a three months horizon is consid-
ered. Essentially, this is to capture the loss of momentum of liquidity transformation when the
8Defining 10% as the threshold would lead to a huge amount of distress cases which are unlikely to be all
real distress for the financial and economic system, whereas a threshold value of 20% would miss out on some
important macroeconomic events. Hence, 15% seems to be a good compromise.
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term spread starts to decline (see Section 2). Moreover, the idea is that a peak does not emerge
suddenly but instead build up over some period of time. LIQcumt , at time t, is given by
LIQcumt =
(
LIQt
LIQt−2
)
− 1.
Note that LIQt has a unit root
9 and LIQcumt is a stationary time-series. In order to smooth and
better extract the cyclical nature of the time-series, we use a simple 6 months moving average
which is calculated on a rolling basis10. Therefore, LIQcyclet is given by
LIQcyclet =
(∑6
t=1 LIQ
cum
t
6
)
.
More sophisticated filtering approaches would have been feasible but in order to keep the deriva-
tion of the binary liquidity transformation indicator as simple and transparent as possible, a
moving average procedure is used. A peak phase in liquidity creation is identified if LIQcyclet is
above its endogenous threshold value which is specified as a simple 24 months moving average
(MA) on a rolling basis11. If LIQcyclet is above this threshold, the binary indicator is equal to 1
and signals an upcoming peak in the liquidity transformation time-series. Therefore, the binary
liquidity transformation indicator, D(LIQcyclet ), is given by
D(LIQcyclet ) =
1 if LIQ
cycle
t > MA(LIQ
cycle
t )
0 if LIQcyclet < MA(LIQ
cycle
t )
, (1)
where D is the binary indicator taking the value 1 and 0. Therefore, the liquidity transformation
cycle enters its peak phase at time t, if D(LIQcyclet−1 ) = 0 and D(LIQ
cycle
t ) = 1. The signal is
valid (i.e. the binary indicator remains 1) until LIQcyclet falls below the threshold value.
D. Construction of the Binary Term Spread Indicator
The binary distress indicator for the term spread, D(TSt), is given by
D(TSt) =

1 if TSt < TSt−6
1 if TSt ≤ 0
0 if TSt > TSt−6
. (2)
9Using an ADF test (∆LIQt = µ+ βt+ γLIQt−1 −∑pj=1 ∆LIQt−j + t) with automatic lag-length selection
(AIC), the Null Hypothesis is accepted at the 1% level, independent of specifying a trend and/or intercept term.
10Note that selection of sensible higher MA values would have not dramatically changed the results, however,
it would have reduced the peak-to-peak amplitude in absolute hight.
11Note, that the average period length of LIQcyclet is below 24 months. The peak-to-peak amplitude varies
significantly but is sufficiently captured by the 24 months MA, so that every peak of the liquidity transformation
time-series is captured. The 24 months MA has a similar hight as the Root Mean Square amplitude.
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Hence, D(TSt) is in a ”declining state” if either the slope of the term spread is negative or
its level is zero or below. The latter case is included to account for the fact that liquidity
transformation becomes unprofitable if the term spread is zero. Even if the term spread is
rising in this region, banks have no incentive to take on funding liquidity risks.
D. Construction of the Binary Equity Market Indicator
A regularity condition is set to ensure that a fragility signal only occurs if the equity mar-
ket is above its long-term trend which makes sure that equity prices are still considered strong
by market participants when a financial fragility signal is triggered. Again, a simple 24 months
MA is used as a threshold value to determine the market state. The binary DAX indicator,
D(It), is given by
D(It) =
1 if DAXt > MA(DAX)0 if DAXt < MA(DAX) . (3)
E. Construction of the Financial Fragility Indicator
To construct the binary fragility indicator, the binary liquidity creation indicator, the binary
term spread and the binary DAX indicator are multiplicatively combined. Therefore, only if
all three dummy variables are equal to 1 (i.e. D(·) = 1 for all binary indicator variables), a
fragility signal is triggered. Constructing the early warning indicator multiplicatively has the
advantage that there is no need to weight the dummy variables and that the indicator can
explicitly capture the set of conditions for an asset price peak. Hence, the financial fragility
indicator, ycrisist , is given by combining equation (1) to (3) which yields
ycrisist = D(It) ∗ [D(TSt) ∗D(LIQcyclet )],
and which will have the following cases
D(ycrisist ) =
Crisis if ycrisist = 1No crisis if ycrisist = 0 . (4)
Figure 2 outlines the construction process for the fragility indicator and summarizes the con-
ditions laid down for it in Section 2. As it can be seen, there were two instances where the
equity market was above its long-term trend (Subgraph a), the term spread has been declining
for some time (Subgraph b), and the liquidity transformation indicator was above its threshold
level (Subgraph c). All three dummy variables were therefore equal to 1 and the fragility indi-
cator send a signal of a pending peak in the equity market (the binary stress indicator is equal
to 1 in Subgraph d). The construction of the indicator makes a real-time use possible.
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Graph (a): Equity Market Price and its 24 months MA (bullet points show the peaks to be predicted) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph (b): Term Spread 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph (c): Cyclical liquidity transformation time-series and its 24 months MA (dotted line) 
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Graph (d): Binary signal for financial fragility 
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Figure 2: The Real-Time Signal for Financial Fragility: Idealized Presentation of two Distress Signals
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4 Empirical Results
Table 1 summarizes the empirical results. In total, there have been eleven instances, where the
DAX declined at least 15% and all eleven cases were predicted correctly. The fragility indicator
triggered a total of 20 signals for financial distress, leaving nine potentially false signals. Two
instances, where the DAX declined by only 11%/12% are considered borderline cases which are
counted as correct predictions. In the first case (1984-01), a severe German recession occurred
three months after the fragility signal: Industrial Production lost 10% within one month, the
most severe decline ever observed over the 37 year time horizon. In the second case (2000-10),
the equity market rebounded from its initial decline which started in February 2000. Since the
major decline in the equity market occurred after October 2000, we count the signal 2000-02
as a borderline signal, although the absolute peak actually occurred in 2000-02. The seven
remaining signals were not associated with a decline which would be significant enough to be
an indication of distress for the equity market and should be interpreted as false positive signals.
The duration of the fragility signal is driven nearly entirely by the duration of the peak phase of
liquidity transformation which was on average 3.2 months (see DUR1). On average, the equity
market reached its peak 2.9 months after the fragility signal was initially triggered (see 4− 2).
In fact, in over 80% of all cases, the peak in the equity market realized within the time frame
where the fragility signal was valid. The average decline resulted in a loss of about 31% and
had a duration of about one year. In 80% of all cases where an equity market peak formed,
an economic recession occurred12. On average, the economic activity started to decline nine
months after the financial fragility signal (see 11− 2) and five months after the equity market
peak. This indicates that a peak in liquidity transformation may indeed have real economic ef-
fects, for instance via a lower supply of credit, as suggested by Adrian, Estrella, and Shin (2010).
This paper demonstrates that the peak phase of the liquidity creation cycle can serve as a
timing signal for the end of an upwards movement in equity prices and therefore finds empirical
evidence for the financial fragility condition outlined in Section 2. The results also support
Berger and Bouwman (2008), who argue that ”... the subprime lending crisis was preceded by a
dramatic build-up of positive abnormal liquidity creation,...” [p. 30] and that too much liquidity
transformation may lead to financial fragility. Although the indicator captured all significant
equity market peaks, there still remain some false positive signals. It should be noted that
during the derivation of the financial fragility condition, some rather ad-hoc assumptions about
the time lag for the input parameters were made (24 months for the threshold values and 6
months for all other values). The performance figure with respect to the Type II errors may
further be improved if a grid search that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio is conducted.
12An economic recession is defined if Industrial Production is lower today than it was 12 months ago. The
date at which the economic decline started is identified as the peak data.
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5 Conclusion
This paper was motivated by observing that the liquidity risk management actions of financial
intermediaries spilled over to asset markets during the subprime crisis which started in 2007.
The next step was to incorporate the term spread in the analysis which can be regarded as a
natural measure of the marginal profitability of bank liquidity transformation and the incentive
for funding liquidity risk-taking of banks. The goal of this paper was then to empirically test
if a unification of the term spread and the liquidity risk cycle of the banking system into a
financial fragility indicator can time a certain point (in this paper: the peak phase) of the asset
price cycle. It was found that the financial fragility indicator predicted all major equity market
downturns for Germany over the past 37 years. Moreover, 80% of the equity market peaks
were followed by peaks in economic activity. Therefore, if a policymaker observes a fragility
signal and the formation of an equity market peak, the probability for an economic recession is
very high. In this context, future research may investigate whether monetary policy needs to
account for financial stability, given that liquidity transformation has financial and real effects.
Moreover, it would be interesting to analyze the usability of liquidity transformation and the
resulting funding liquidity risks of banks within the monetary analysis process and comparing
its performance to standard money and credit aggregates.
Instead of trying to describe the whole asset price cycle, this paper focused on the question
if it is possible to predict the peak phase of asset prices (in this paper: the peak phase of equity
markets). Accordingly the statements are only valid for the peak phase in the asset price cycle.
This paper did not attempt to describe the size or the duration of the subsequent asset price
decline. In principle, this indicator can be used as an early warning indicator for financial and
real economic distress. However, the suitability and performance of the indicator will depend
on how precisely liquidity transformation of the financial sector can be measured: Germany has
a bank dominated financial system and the size of the shadow banking sector is comparatively
small, so the official bank balance sheet statistics are sufficient. For the United States, Berger
and Bouwman (2008) find that a liquidity transformation indicator which includes off-balance
sheet elements of banks is preferred. If the indicator works well in a system where most liquidity
is provided outside the banking system is therefore a question of data availability. Finally, it
must be stressed that this paper explicitly refrains from assessing the optimality of bank fund-
ing liquidity risk-taking. The growth enhancing properties of liquidity transformation were not
discussed and it was not the subject of this paper to investigate whether bank risk-taking is
socially desirable.
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